Terrorism in Europe by Khosrokhavar, F.
Politics
In Europe there are distinct groups in-
volved in terrorist activities: those re-
lated to European issues like ETA
Basque terrorism and those which
have non-territorial leftist centred ide-
ologies (for example, the recent threat
letters in Italy connected to leftist
cells), and radical Islamic groups. Ter-
rorist activities of the latter are often
ascribed to al-Qaeda, but, in a way, al-
Qaeda is a misnomer: a loosely con-
nected, “franchised” ensemble of ter-
rorist cells, largely autonomous to-
wards each other and having a real ca-
pacity for self-financing without refer-
ence to the “mother” institution. Their
relations are more in terms of knowing
each other through the Afghan camps
in the 1980s and 1990s (during the
fight against the Soviet Union and the
period of the Taliban regime) and in
consequence of the same antagonistic
attitudes towards the West. 
Within these groups, one can see
two types of actors: those who have
roots in the Muslim countries (mainly
North Africa and Pakistan), and those
who are converts and have joined the
organisations after their conversion.
Up to now, we know of no member of
these radical Islamist cells who had not
converted or professed Islam as his re-
ligion. On the other hand, there is no
known organic link between the al-
Qaeda type terrorism and other activist
or terrorist organizations. Such links
might be established in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Chechnya or in some other trou-
bled spots in the world, but this is not
the case, yet, in Europe. Among these
terrorist cells, the Moroccan ones seem to have a wide influence. The
Madrid train explosions in March 2004, according to the latest findings,
were sponsored and carried out by these Moroccan cells, although one
of their prominent members was from Tunisia. 
The cases of England and France
Another feature of European Islamist terrorism is its wide use of re-
cruits whose parents or grandparents came from the former European
colonies. Among them two countries have been the major centres for
the development of this type of activity: France and the United King-
dom. Though Italy, Spain, and even countries like Holland, Belgium,
Germany, and Greece have harboured these terrorist groups as well,
but the role of France and England is distinct in so far as many mem-
bers of these terrorist cells seem to have been English or French by
birth or acquisition, their parents originating from the ex-colonies. In
England, the Pakistanis or some “Arabs” (coming from North Africa
mainly through France and having established themselves in the Unit-
ed Kingdom), and in France, people from Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia
have played a significant role in the jihadist activities. This fact seems
to be noteworthy. In Germany, where the majority of the Muslim pop-
ulation is of Turkish (or Kurdish with Turkish citizenship) background,
the Arab perpetrators of the 11 September 2001, who had spent many
months in Germany, did not have any organic link with the Muslim
populations of Germany. The ex-colonial citizens of France and Eng-
land, or those from North Africa (in France), and Pakistan or North
Africa in England (but not Bangladesh or India) play a major role in ter-
rorist activities in these two countries in particular, and in Europe in
general. The fact that Bangladesh does
not play a major role is probably due to
its non-involvement in the Kashmir
problem which pushes Pakistan to radi-
cal islamism. Moreover, Pakistan played
(and still plays) a major role in Taliban
style activities.
Post-colonial heritage
The reasons for the distinct roles of
France and England in the jihadist ac-
tivities in Europe are manifold. First,
the colonial memory has its own say in
this matter: many of these young
males feel despised or rejected in their
new country in France or England.
They feel deeply estranged, on the
other hand, from the secular and “god-
less” Western societies in which they
develop a counter-secular identity be-
fore getting involved in Islam as the
major bearer of their hatred or rejec-
tion of societies which do not recog-
nize them as such. Among these male
youth (in which there is no female con-
stituency up to now), many belong to
the lower middle class while some are
economically excluded. Some have the
European citizenship (French, English,
or even Spanish) but some have the
North African or Pakistani one: they
have been either denied the citizen-
ship, or have simply not asked for it, or
did not stay long enough to be entitled
to it. In Spain, some have only settled
there a few years ago or even more re-
cently. 
On the whole, these groups, which
constitute a very small proportion of
the immigrant population from North
Africa or Pakistan, have developed a counter-Western or counter-Euro-
pean identity. This is mainly due to their ambiguous situation in Eu-
rope, as well as Western policies towards the Mus-
lim world, in particular, Palestine, Afghanistan,
and Chechnya (in Paris, one dismantled cell had
endeavoured to blow up the Russian Embassy),
and more recently, Iraq.
The problem of jihadist cells in Europe is, there-
fore, both internal (estranged people from the
former colonies) and external (the spread of ter-
rorist networks with anti-Western jihadist ideolo-
gies, favoured by hot issues like the Palestinian
and Chechen problems). Any policy “externaliz-
ing” the causes, i.e. denying their internal roots, is
doomed to failure. Accordingly, any policy aiming
at exclusive repression of these youth groups can
only be short term and will create new problems
as well. A mixture of repressive and persuasive
policies is necessary in order to promote an effi-
cient counter-terrorist activity in the long term.
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The terrorist attack on passenger trains in
Madrid on 11 March caused shock and anger.
Alerted by the assault, political authorities all
over Europe have intensified their efforts to
suppress jihadist activities. The causes of
militant Islamist activism in Europe are often
considered to be external, emanating from
conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, etc. But any policy
based upon this externalization, i.e. denying
the existence of internal roots, in particular
the existence of alienated European Muslim
youth, is doomed to failure. 
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